IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JULIE PATRIOT, 				)	No. 1:08-mc-00000
Petitioner, 					)
v. 					) 	UNITED STATES REPLY MEMO
UNITED STATES, et al., 			)	IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION
Respondents.				)	TO DISMISS

UNITED STATES’ REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS

This case concerns Julie Patriot’s petition to quash the Internal Revenue
Service’s administrative summons issued to Chase Bank NA. Patriot claims that
the United States’ motion to dismiss should be denied because: (1) 26 U.S.C. § 7609
must be read in two parts, the first establishing subject-matter jurisdiction upon all
district courts and the second applying constitutional personal jurisdiction standards to
a court’s analysis; (2) that Chase Bank NA “resides or is found” in this judicial district
because it services credit cards on behalf of a corporation operating within this judicial
district, potentially lobbies within the judicial district, potentially conducts business
within this judicial district, and because Chase Bank NA engages in internet commerce
with consumers within the District of Columbia; (3) the “minimum contacts” standards
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) are fulfilled; and (4) the
summons violates her Fifth Amendment rights. Each of these arguments fail.
1/The United States does not address Petitioner’s claim that the “minimum
contacts” requirements of International Shoe are fulfilled because those requirements
deal with personal jurisdiction, which is unrelated to the United States’ motion to
dismiss.
I. Petitioner’s claim that 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h) can be read in “two parts” is
wholly unsupported
26 U.S.C. § 7609(h)(1) states that “The United States district court for the district
within which the person to be summoned resides or is found shall have jurisdiction to
hear and determine any proceedings brought under subsection (b)(2), (f), or (g).”
Patriot asserts that she reads 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h)(1) “in two parts.” (Pet.’s Opp. ¶
2.) She claims that section 7609 contains dual meanings whereby (1) all district courts
have been granted subject matter jurisdiction regarding administrative summonses;
and (2) that the “resides or is found” provision of the statute “is a matter of personal
jurisdiction.” (Id. ¶ 3.) Patriot’s opposition is, however, devoid of citation to any
supporting jurisprudence for this assertion. (See Pet.’s Opp. ¶¶ 2-5.)
“‘A waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be
unequivocally expressed in statutory text’ and ‘will be strictly construed, in terms of its
scope, in favor of the sovereign.’” Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1942 -43
(2008). Put simply, personal jurisdiction 1/ has no import into an analysis pursuant to
26 U.S.C. § 7609. See Cook v. U.S., No. 01-951, 2002 WL 221084, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 8,
2002) (“The personal jurisdiction cases cited and discussed by Petitioner are inapposite
to the Court's analysis of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §
7609(h)(1).”); see also Cayman Nat. Bank, Ltd. v. United States, No. 06-50-T-24, 2007 WL
Case 1:08-mc-00340-CKK Document 5 Filed 07/08/2008 Page 2 of 7
2/It appears that Petitioner’s assertion is premised upon a belief that “Internet
commerce” creates personal jurisdiction, rather than subject matter jurisdiction. As
noted in Section I, supra, personal jurisdiction is inapplicable to the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction analysis.
641176, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2007) (“various courts have found that the [] ‘resides’ or
‘found’ provisions in § 7609(h) go to a court's subject matter jurisdiction”) (collecting
cases omitted).
Patriot’s claim that the language of section 7609(h) creates a bifurcated
jurisdictional requirements is wholly unfounded and incorrect as a matter of law.
II. Chase Bank NA does not “reside[] or is found” in this judicial district
Petitions to quash administrative summonses must be filed in the judicial district
in which the summons recipient is located. (See U.S. Mem. of Law 1-2.) McCammon
claims that section 7609 does not require a physical presence within the judicial district.
(Pet.’s Opp. ¶ 8.) This claim is unfounded.
a. Internet commerce is insufficient to create jurisdiction pursuant
to 26 U.S.C. § 7609.
Patriot claims that “Internet commerce” supports jurisdiction2/ in this
case. (Pet.’s Opp. ¶ 14.) This claim is incorrect. Internet commerce does not provide a
court with subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to section 7609. Oldham v. United
States, No. 01-1410, 2002 WL 850205 at *2 (D. Or. Mar. 21, 2002) (holding that
“Computer access does not satisfy the jurisdiction requirement under 26 U.S.C. § 7609");
Scharringhausen v. United States, No. 02-2343, 2003 WL 21517773 at *1 (S.D. Ca. Jan. 15,
2003) (holding that the summons recipient’s internet commerce within the judicial
district was insufficient to create jurisdiction pursuant to section 7609 because it did not
have an office located within the judicial district.).
b. Bare allegations of “affiliations” and “services” with entities residing within this judicial district are insufficient
Patriot additionally alleges that jurisdiction is conferred because Chase
Bank: (1) services credit cards issued by an entity located within this judicial district;
and (2) has “affiliations with local businesses or provides services to residents” of this
judicial district. (Pet.’s Opp. ¶¶10-11.) This claim fails for two reasons. First,
Patriot once again confuses personal jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction.
See Section I, supra. Second, Petitioner Chase Bank NA does not have an office located
within this judicial district, Petitioner does not allege that Petitioner conducted business
with Chase Bank NA within this judicial district, and the summoned records are not
located within this judicial district. See Gerber v. United States, No. 06-cv-32, 2007 WL
2003089 at *1 (D.D.C. May 29, 2007) (dismissing a petition to quash because the thirdparty
record keeper and summoned records were located outside the judicial district
and because the third party record keeper did not have an office within the judicial
district.); see also U.S. Mem. of Law 1-2.
III. The summons does not violate McCammon’s fifth amendment rights
Patriot’s claim that the summons must be quashed because she would be
“forced to provide evidence against herself. . .” is specious. (Pet.’s Opp. ¶ 24.) The
Internal Revenue Service seeks documents from Chase Bank NA, not petitioner. The
Fifth Amendment, therefore, does not apply to the summons. Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973) (discussing that the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable to an
Internal Revenue Service summons issued to a third party recordkeeper because it “is a
necessary part of the process of law enforcement and tax investigation.”); see also
Nicholls v. United States, No. 83-145, 1983 WL 1660 at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 1983) (holding
that “The force of compulsion must be on the individual asserting the right, and the
individual cannot object to enforcement of a[n Internal Revenue Service] summons
against a third party who possesses the material sought.”)
Conclusion
This Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to permit it to quash the
Internal Revenue Service’s administrative summons issued to Chase Bank NA. The
United States motion to dismiss should, therefore, be granted in full and Patriot’s
petition to quash denied.

Date: July 8, 2008.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Benjamin J. Weir
BENJAMIN J. WEIR (D.C. Bar No.494045)
Trial Attorney, Tax Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Post Office Box 227
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
Telephone: (202) 307-0855
Fax: (202) 514-6866
benjamin.j.weir@usdoj.gov
Counsel for United States

OF COUNSEL:
JEFFREY A. TAYLOR
United States Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Benjamin J. Weir, certify that on July 8, 2008, true and correct copies of
the foregoing were sent via the Court’s ECF service protocol to the following:

PATRIOT LAWYER
Arlington, VA 22209

and via postage prepaid U.S. mail to the following

Chase Bank USA NA
7610 West Washington St.
Indianapolis, IN 46231.

/s/ Benjamin J. Weir
BENJAMIN J. WEIR