UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
Shakti Patriot )
PETITIONER ) CASE NUMBER: MC-05-18 MV
)
) PETITIONER’S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO
) PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO “MOTION TO DISMISS OR
) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND TO ENFORCE IRS SUMMONS”
vs. )
)
The United States, Wells Fargo Bank, )
Bank of America, Northwest Bank )
RESPONDENTS )
[Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 3, filed 4/1/05]
[Respondent's Supplemental Motion To Dismiss, Doc. 6, filed 5/5/2005]
[Respondent’s Reply to Petitioner’s Response Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 9, filed 5/19/2005]
Petitioner Shakti Patriot Ph.D., pursuant to the Special Procedures for Third Party Summonses, 26 USC § 7609, hereby files this PETITIONER’s REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO “MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION TO QUASH SUMMONS ISSUED TO WELLS FARGO” to halt the above named third party record keepers from revealing Petitioner's private records to the Internal Revenue Service, and to quash the summonses. Responded has asserted several claims that Petitioner finds imperative to replay and clarify. Petitioner emphasizes that the Petition as well as all arguments and challenges give have been all done in a good faith.
Background - Complete Lack of Good Faith on the Side of IRS Agent
1. Petitioner has received first communication from Agent Cordova in November of 2004 (see Exhibit A). In this communication Agent Cordova has stated:
“The Internal Revenue Service has determined that some taxpayers have used offshore payment cards (including credit, debit or charge cards) issued by banks in foreign jurisdictions or offshore financial arrangements to avoid United States income taxes.
We have selected you for examination because we have identified you as a holder of an offshore payment card(s) or a participant in offshore financial arrangements.”
That was a complete shock to the Petitioner for the Petitioner never had a personal offshore bank account or an offshore credit card. Therefore the claim “we have identified you as a holder of an offshore payment card(s)” was obviously untrue and blatant accusation without any supporting proof. It was clear indication of an arbitrary selection of the Petitioner as a target without any evidence or probable cause. Even if Petitioner did have an offshore bank that would not be illegal since there is no law forbidding a possession or use of such accounts. So the above statements by Agent Cordova have these implication:
a) That IRS has evidence based in facts that Petitioner has tried to avoid paying some taxes.
b) That IRS has evidence based in facts that Petitioner has personal offshore bank account.
c) However no facts have been given to the Petitioner for the above claims, indicating that the IRS can accuse people without any evidence.
d) The statement given contradicts it self for it says: “we have identified you as a holder of an offshore payment card(s)” but then it say “or a participant in offshore financial arrangements.” Well which it is? First or second or the IRS is just guessing in the dark. That is clear proof that the Agent Cordova does not have any evidence based in facts.
That is what is called a witch hunt and has no protection of law and is clear indication of the Respondents sinister motive and a lack of good faith. But that is just the beginning.
2. In second communication Agent Cordova requested to meet with the Petitioner. As it was described in previous Petitioner’s filing, he agreed to meet but on a different date. Agent Cordova has canceled this meeting as he admitted in his Declaration. Now comes the question why Agent Cordova first requested meeting and then canceled it, without having even one opportunity to meet with the Petitioner? To answer that lets look in the Agent’s Cordova own words:
“Based on my 19 years of experience with the IRS, when taxpayers insist on sworn statements before a court reporter, after attempts to contact and discuss the situation with the taxpayer, that exercise is not helpful …”
So what Agent Cordova is telling us is that based on his 19 year experience when he is to conduct meeting with other party under oath and before a court reporter he should run away and try to continue his fishing expedition in some, as he puts it, “other ways.” Agent Cordova changed his mind not because he was no able to meet with the petitioner but he did not want to be under oath. Well why Agent Cordova did not want to meet under oath? Petitioner did not have problem with that and was sure that would be for the benefit of all parties involved. Agent Cordova explanation is: “that exercise is not helpful.” Really, and why is that?
The obvious answer to this is that Agent Cordova does not have ligimit investigation and did not what to be under oath for he would have to either lie (purge himself) or revile that he has no ligimit investigation. So again we see that Responded has not been dealing wit Petitioner in a good faith with sincere intentions. Not wanting to meet under oath with disputing party is clean indication of the lack of good faith.
Also please notice inaccuracy in Agent Cordova statement when he says: “after attempts to contact and discuss.” There was only one attempt. If that can be even called an attempt since a real attempt would be when both parties agreed on data and place when and where to meet and one party does not show up. That would be a real attempt. This appears to be a repeating theme in Respondents way of expressing and exaggerating things as it will be explained further.
In addition, what Agent Cordova says: “when taxpayers insist on sworn statements”, is not true either. If examined, the Petitioner response documented in Respondents Doc. 9, Exhibit C3, there is no where word “insist” to be found. Petitioner followed Agent Cordova instructions:
“Should you need to change this date, please contact me to arrange a more convenient meeting. I will consider the above appointment confirmed if I don't hear from you by Friday January 28, 2005. (Doc. 9, Exhibit C2)
Petitioner chose a Court Reporting Service for it though that an independent place may be more comfortable for Agent Cordova, and having the transcript (paid by the Petitioner) would be desired by Agent Cordova for his investigation. Petitioner did not have any idea that Agent Cordova did not want to talk with the Petitioner on the record even though according to him he is doing “legal official investigation.” Or is he?
3. Summons issued to Bank of America is the continuing proof of the lack of good faith on the part of Respondent. This summons has been issued on grounds that Petitioner was registered with New Mexico State Corporation Commission as the registered agent, officer, and director of Electronic Automation, Inc. Well Petitioner never disputed that, but the Electronic Automation, Inc. closed at the end of 2000 and final return was filed. Electronic Automation, Inc. existed only for one year, it filed all corporate tax returns and was closed.
So, after five years, that is used as ground to seek summons from Bank of America even though Agent Cordova did not give any evidence that there is even remote suspicion that Electronic Automation Inc. continue to operate after it was closed or that returns filed are in question, or fraud or any other wrong doing has been suspected. That is prime example of unreasonable search and seizure and it is exactly what is protected by the 4th Amendment to the Constitution of the
In the Exhibit 4 of the Respondent’s Reply to Petitioner Response (Doc. 9) Agent Cordova has presented Public Regulation Commission for Electronic Automation, Inc. as it can be seen the status is “in the process of revocation.” Petitioner has for last four years kept on requesting Public Regulation Commission to update status on Electronic Automation, Inc. from “in the process of revocation” to terminated. Nonetheless, it is clear that Electronic Automation, Inc. has not been and is not operating in
4. Furthermore, beside being groundless summons to the Bank of America is over reaching, as well as summons to Wells Fargo for it is attempting to associate Petitioner with two entities, Ananda Enterprises and Earth Light Institute, even though again not a shred of evidence, based in facts, was given to shows that Petitioner created, or owned these entitles. Agent Cordova could have put there
5. Petitioner is requesting this courts to issue a probate with Bank of America and Wells Fargo and see if Ananda Enterprises and Earth Light Institute even have accounts with the Bank of America or Wells Fargo and if they do not, as Petitioner suspects, quash immediately summons to these banks.
Government did not present a prima facie case
(a) No Legitimate Purpose of Investigation
6. In Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 3, p. 1, p. 5) it is stated:
“K. Steve Cordova, a duly commissioned IRS Revenue Agent in
“Agent Cordova issued both summonses for a proper purpose - to determine Stanojevich's personal income tax liability for the years 1997-1998 and 2001-2003 since he only filed returns for 1999 and 2000.”
However, neither Respondent nor Agent Cordova have shown what make Petitioner liable for personal income tax. They are stating that purpose of investigation is to determine “personal income tax liability” without showing the law, or act that is making Petitioner liable for personal income tax. So Petitioner is asking, Respondent, Agent Cordova, and this court what law make Petitioner liable for personal income tax? Without that, there can not be any investigation into “personal income tax liability.”
(b) Inquiry is NOT Relevant to That Purpose
7. In addressing the relevancy of the investigation the Respondent make claims:
“He has companies registered in
Which is not true. Respondent have shown no support for such claim in Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 3), however, in Response to Petitioner response (Doc. 9) in exhibit C4 they showed that Petitioner did owned one company, which Petitioner never denied. What Respondent is misrepresenting and misstating here, is that the Petitioner is owning companies is
“The IRS tried to address Mr. Stanojevich directly before sending the summonses to the banks”
Which is another misrepresentation and misstatement. First what does mean “tried to address.” Where does it says that requirement for relevancy of the investigation is to only “try to address” or for that matter for issuing summonses too. Petitioner discussed that he was never given chance to meet with Agent Cordova.
(c) Administrative Steps Have NOT Been Followed
8. Summons to Well Fargo Bank NM has not been served correctly. 26 U.S.C. § 7603(a) and 7603(b)(1) state:
§ 7603. Service of summons
(a) In general … shall be served by the Secretary, by an attested copy delivered in hand to the person to whom it is directed, or left at his last and usual place of abode; and the certificate of service signed by the person serving the summons shall be evidence of the facts it states on the hearing of an application for the enforcement of the summons …
(b) Service by mail to third-party record-keepers
A summons referred to in subsection (a) for the production of books, papers, records, or other data by a third-party record-keeper may also be served by certified or registered mail to the last known address of such record-keeper.
As can be see there are two ways to serve the summons: first in 26 U.S.C. § 7603(a) “… by an attested copy delivered in hand to the person to whom it is directed, or left at his last and usual place of abode;” and the second in 26 U.S.C. § 7603(b)(1) “be served by certified or registered mail to the last known address of such record-keeper.” Since Agent Cordova used 26 U.S.C. § 7603(b)(1) Service by mail to third-party record-keepers for the summons to Wells Fargo Bank NM then the address he used definitely is NOT the “the last known address of such record-keeper” as required by 26 U.S.C. § 7603(b)(1) and thus the summons has not been served properly. Last known address for the Wells Fargo Bank NA is
Agent Cordova has proudly stated in his Declaration that he has been agent for 19 years and question erases how it is possible that agent with so many years of experience can make such mistake, or was it really a mistake? In Respondents Reply to Petitioner’s Response Agent Cordova in his Second Declaration stays that is was the Wells Fargo Bank who gave him this address. Lets for the moment assume that that is true. The obvious question is, how it is possible that agent with 19 yeas of experience did not immediately notice that address is out of state and called Wells Fargo Bank and enquire what is the reason for been given such address since he is seeking records that are with party which is residing in New Mexico.
If we are dealing with a novice agent, we could may be conclude it was a mistake, but when we are dealing with the agent with 19 years of experience, it is obvious that it can not be a mistake. By mailing summons to Wells Fargo Bank NM to Portland, Oregon Agent Cordova was hoping to avoid jurisdiction of this courts even though the summoned party resides and is to be found in the court’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, Agent Cordova hoped that it will be harder for the Petitioner to quash this illegal summons since the way it was issued represents jurisdictional confusion and nightmare. Also it is obvious that District Court of Oregon does not have jurisdiction over records in
Why would Agent Cordova do that? Because he wanted to avoid the issue of jurisdiction for he obviously does not have a legitimate investigation. This is again another example of Respondents total lack of good faith and proper procedure and for that reason this summons should be quashed immediately.
Jurisdiction
9. Petitioner would like to address the Respondents repeated attempt to claim that this court does not have the jurisdiction over Wells Fargo Bank NM summons, since it was mailed to the address in Oregon. In recent, still going on court case U.S. Attorney stated:
"The threshold test under U.S.C. 7609(h)(1) requires a Branch Office" The case that was cited was
Petitioner did Service the Petition Upon the United States
10. Respondent is repeatedly bringing mute point (Doc. 3 p. 2, Doc. 9 p. 2) by claiming that Petition to Quash was not served properly to U. S. Attorney. It states:
“Petitioner served federal district court, not the U.S. Attorney's Office. Petitioner presents no legal authority that service upon the federal courthouse, which then forwarded the documents to the U.S. Attorney's Office, is somehow effective service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 specifies to who it should be server and not how, so Respondent persistent focus on how it was delivered and ignoring the fact that it was served to the U. S. Attorney and on time is mute and a waste of Petitioner’s and this court’s time, and Respondent should be sanctioned for that. Effective serve is one that makes sure that required documents have been served to parties identified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. U. S. Attorney did not claim that it did not receive or did not receive on time Petition to Quash. Everything else is mute point.
Respondent is continuously slandering the Petitioner and Petitioner is requesting that the Respondent be sanctioned for that. For example, in Respondents replay (Doc. 9, p. 2) it states:
“Petitioner also claims the United States Attorney's Office ‘is not in the phone book,’ (Doc. 7 p 2 i 6), and attached to his Response page 36 from the phone book's Government Pages. However, on page 37 of the Government Pages there is a telephone listing for the United States Attorney's Office.”
First, Petitioner claimed that the address of the U. S. Attorney and not the phone, As a matter of fact petitioner did try to include page 36 and 37 in his response, however, accidentally included twice the page 36. In Petitioner’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7, p. 2) it is stated: “Civil Process Clerk or US Attorney address is not in the phone book.” Petitioner never claimed that the phone of U. A. Attorney is not in the phone book. As a matter of fact Petitioner did try to call that number but just got the answering machine. This is a good example how the respondent takes Petitioner’s words out of context and misrepresented them. This really is not a professional response addressing the issues and merits of the case. It is more like a tantrum of an immature child that wants his toys back.
11. Another example of such behavior on the part of Respondent is in its response (Doc. 9, p. 3) were it is stated:
“Petitioner has already filed a Petition to Quash the Wells Fargo summons in federal district court in
12. Which again is misrepresentation since from it appears that the Petitioner has filed the Petition to Quash in
Legal Consideration
13. The summonses have not been served properly for the section 7603 states:
§ 7603. Service of summons
(a) In general A summons issued under section 6420 (e)(2), 6421 (g)(2), 6427 (j)(2), or 7602 shall be served by the Secretary, by an attested copy delivered in hand to the person to whom it is directed, or left at his last and usual place of abode;
None of the summonses were served by “an attested copy” to any of the third party, see Mimick v. United States, 952 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1991). Even “Citing only § 7603, the Eighth Circuit held that attested copies must be served on both the third-party record-keepers and the taxpayer.
14. The summonses have not been served properly issued for they violate Petitioners right to protect his interests. In Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) Supreme Court says:
“Also in any such procedures, third parties may intervene to protect their interests, or in the event the taxpayer is not a party to the summons before the hearing officer, he, too, may intervene.”
Summonses are requesting that the summoned records being mailed to the Agent Cordova, thus not giving the Petitioner hearing opportunity before hearing officer.
Furthermore, in Reisman v. Caplin Supreme Court says:
“This Court has never passed upon the rights of a party summoned to appear before a hearing officer under 7602. However, the Government concedes that a witness or any interested party may attack the summons before the hearing officer.”
In additions, it is important to recognize that Supreme Court in the same case has said:
“Should the challenge to the summons be rejected by the hearing examiner and the witness still refuse to testify or produce, the examiner is given no power to enforce compliance or to impose sanctions for noncompliance.”
So, since Petitioner is refusing to allow that his records with third-parties to be produced “the examiner is given no power to enforce compliance or to impose sanctions for noncompliance.”
“On the other hand, in tax enforcement proceedings the hearing officer has no power of enforcement or right to levy any sanctions. It is true that any person summoned who ‘neglects to appear or to produce’ may be prosecuted under 7210 and is subject to a fine not exceeding [375 U.S. 440, 447] $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than a year, or both. However, this statute on its face does not apply where the witness appears and interposes good faith challenges to the summons. It only prescribes punishment where the witness ‘neglects’ either to appear or to produce. ... It is sufficient to say that noncompliance is not subject to prosecution thereunder when the summons is attacked in good faith.”
Petitioner has never refused to appear in good faith before hearing office and answer all lawful questions or produce any records that are required by law. Petitioner has the right to be present, if third party summoned appears in front of the hearing officer and requesting this court to enforce this right should such occasion arises.
15. In Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 3, p. 3) Respondent states:
“The IRS, as the delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury, has the authority to inquire into the payment of taxes”
However, neither the Agent Cordova nor the Respondent have shown the proof of evidence of such delegation in served summonses as required by law. Furthermore, “authority to inquire into the payment of taxes” does not indicates not identifies payment of what taxes and payment by who. So there is no reason for the Petitioner to believe that he is a subject to such authority.
16. Said summons was erroneously issued by Agent Cordova. since said Section 7602 does not apply, in any way, to petitioner or to his agents, debtors or fiduciaries for the following reasons:
a) With respect to Section 7602(a)(l). While this provision authorizes Internal Revenue Service personnel to “examine any books papers, records, or other data:” the provision itself imposes no legal obligation upon petitioner, his agents, debtors or fiduciaries to furnish the material that IRS agents may be “authorized” to examine.
b) With respect to section 7602(a)(2). This provision only authorizes the IRS to summon persons “liable for tax or required to perform the act” or other persons having records related to these conditions. Since petitioner is not a person “liable” for any federal tax nor “required to perform any act” with respect to any federal tax, he does not fall within this provision of Code Section 7602(a)(2).
c) With respect to provision 7602(a)(3). Since this provision only authorizes the IRS to “take testimony” that may be “relevant” to sections (a)(l) and (a)(2) and since neither of these sections, as explained above, applies to either petitioner or his agents, debtors or fiduciaries, section 7602(a)(3) also, does not apply to Petitioner or his agents, debtors, or fiduciaries.
d) Thus no provision of section 7602. as explained above, applies to Petitioner his agents, debtors or fiduciaries.
e) The action of the Respondent by his agents, in seeking to enforce a 7602 summons which does not apply to Petitioner, his agents, debtors, and fiduciaries is. therefore, unlawful and amounts to an abuse of process.
My affidavit attesting to the above is attached and marked Exhibit A.
17. Respondent in the replay (Doc. 9 Exhibit C1) alleges that the exhibit C1 is copy of the computer screen. This exhibit should be struck for Respondent has not been given the opportunity to examine and fully apprise the evidence and because the evidence does not follows the best rule evidence and lacks the authentication. Even if this exhibit is accepted, it confirms Petitioners point that this is a fishing expedition for it can be seen that Wells Fargo allegedly paid $14 in interest to Petitioner. Is that really a cause for investigation? It is clear that Petitioner did not have nor does have any income.
18. Petitioner did not receive any notification or request by Agent Cordova, or for that meter from anybody else, requesting or indicating that Petitioner is required to file any returns, as well as any explanation to what laws or what statues are requiring Petitioner to do so. He only received request from Agent Cordova to meat with Petitioner and “examine” returns that Petitioner allegedly should have filed. Petitioner never refused to do that.
19. Petitioner would like to request Respondent as well as this court to explain to him the following:
The books and records that a person may have who do they belong to? Furthermore, the bank records that belong to a personal bank account to whom they belong? The person whose bank account it is or to somebody else?
Response to the Respondents citations
In Respondents pleadings number of citation have been reference and quoted. They will be reviewed here so it can be shown how improperly and incorrectly they have been used.
20. The first citation was given by the Respondent in the Motion to Dismiss. “The IRS, as the delegate of the Secretary of the Treasury, has the authority to inquire into the payment of taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 7601(a;) Reisman v. Caplin. 375
“A witness or any interested party may attack before the hearing officer, on constitutional or other grounds, a summons issued under 7602. P. 445.”
“Furthermore, we hold that in any of these procedures before either the district judge or United States Commissioner, the witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground. This would include, as the circuits have held, the defenses that the material is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-773, as well as that it is protected by the attorney-client privilege, Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682. In addition, third parties might intervene to protect their interests, or in the event the taxpayer is not a party to the summons before the hearing officer, he too, may intervene. … And this would be true whether the contempt be of a civil or criminal nature.”
So as presented by the Respondent it appears that 26 U.S.C. § 7601(a;) gives unconditional right to summons as well as to enforcement and that that was confirmed by Reisman v. Caplin. 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964). The truth is quite opposite the Reisman v. Caplin is case where the summoned party did not assert its rights properly and at proper time and thus lost the opportunity to quash summonses.
“This relief was not sought here. Had it been, the Commissioner would have had to proceed for compliance, in which event the petitioners or the Bromleys might have intervened and asserted their claims.”
The Petitioner has asserted his right at proper time and proper place with proper constitutional rights thus no enforcement of summonses in question can be granted. Petitioner wants to point out that IRS right to issue a summons is not an issue here, what is a issue here is Petitioner Constitutional right to protect his assets and his property again unreasonable search and seizure.
21. Next citation used by the Respondent in Motion to Dismiss is: “’All citizens of the
a) The quoted citation is an unpublished opinion and not a decision and in the footnote of this case it states:
“This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments;”
Further more it says:
FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY
b) The Cox v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue case quotes 26 C.F.R. §1.1-1(b)(c). The regulations at 26 CFR 1.1-1 attempted to create a specific liability for all “citizens of the
If an Act of Congress fails to create a specific liability for any tax imposed by that Act, then there is no liability for that tax. Executive agencies have no authority to cure any such omission by using regulations to create a liability.
“[A]n administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, especially a liability for a tax or inspection fee.” See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361
22. Furthermore, citation Cox v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue. 99 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1996) (Table), states:
“For eighty years, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes a direct non-apportioned tax upon
However, if we look at the Brushaberv. Union Pac. R.R., 240
“We are of opinion, however, that the confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that the Sixteenth Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of taxation, that is, a power to levy an income tax which although direct should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many contentions advanced in argument to support it, as follows:
(a) The Amendment authorizes only a particular character of direct tax without apportionment, and therefore if a tax is levied under its assumed authority which does not partake of the characteristics exacted by the Amendment, it is outside of the Amendment and is void as a direct tax in the general constitutional sense because not apportioned,
(b) As the Amendment authorizes a tax only upon incomes “from whatever source derived,” the exclusion from taxation of some income of designated persons and classes is not authorized and hence the constitutionality of the law must be tested by the general provisions of the Constitution as to taxation, and thus again the tax is void for want of apportionment,”
Furthermore, it says:
“But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions under it, if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity, thus giving power to impose a different tax in one State or States than was levied in another State or States. This result instead of simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must have been intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.”
So what the Supreme Court is saying is that is that income tax is direct tax and it has to be apportionment and not as Cox v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue states direct non-apportioned. So is that the best citation that Respondent can present as support to there argument? Well obviously it is, and on these grounds it is clear that Respondent does not really have any arguments to show Petitioner liability for income taxes.
23. Based on the Respondent citation of Cox v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue. 99 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1996) (Table), comes clear question what exact statue and what exact law makes Petitioner liable for income tax. Petitioner is pro se, not an attorney and considers following laws of the United Stated of America extremely important and thus is putting this question in front of this Court, as well as in front of the Respondent, to be clarified and explained to the Petitioner.
a) What statue(s) made Petitioner liable for income taxes for year 1997 - 2004
b) Please explain in the language that pro se can understand how factually these statue(s) establish the liability and please pointed to the actual text where the liability is established.
Clarification
24. In Respondent’s replay (Doc. 9 p. 3) there is footnote:
“Petitioner states he offered to meet at a court reporter's office Monday March 28th (Doc. 7 p. 4 ¶ 12), but in fact he offered to meet on Sunday, March 27, 2005. (Exhibit C, Exhibit C2 (1/18/05 IRS letter; Exhibit C3, 1/20/05 Petitioner letter.)
Petitioner want to point out that a typo was made and instead March 28, 2005 a date of March 27, 2005 was printed. Petitioner has caught the mistake, however, the printout without correction was mailed accidentally. However, it is obvious that it was a type mistake since March 27th is Sunday and no Court Reporting Service is working on that day. In addition, the point is really mute sine Agent Cordova decided not meet with Petitioner anyway. If he wanted he could have replied and pointed that March 27th is not acceptable for obvious reasons. Also it is important that Agent Cordova is incorrect in his assertion in his Second Declaration (Doc. 9, Exhibit C) stating: “. Stanojevich suggested we meet at a court reporter's office on Sunday, March 27, 2005.” From the same document exhibit C1 can be seen that date is March 27, 2005 and not Sunday March 27, 2005. Agent Cordova is tying to misrepresent honest typo a if Petitioner has purposely tried to schedule meeting on Sunday which is not the case. Petitioner intended to proposing Monday March 28, 2005.
Conclusion
Petitioner has proven beyond the shadow of a doubt that Agent Cordova as a representative on IRS and Respondent has proceeded and acted toward the Petitioner with a complete lack of good faith. Furthermore, Petition has proofed that Respondent did not show a prima facie case. Petitioner has asserted and is still asserting his constitutional rights that prevent seizure of such records for the purpose of just investigative expedition.
Petitioner did not fail to pay any taxes required by law. Petitioner did not fail to file any returns required by law. Petitioner did not brake any laws that would require investigation and thus any summonses.
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner Shakti Patriot, respectfully requests that the Petition to Quash Summons be honored because the government has not shown any reasons to dismiss it nor to enforce it.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I hereby certify that on or about the above date a copy of this affidavit was mailed to opposing parties.
Date: May 30, 2005 ___________________________________
Petitioner, pro se Shakti Patriot Ph.D.
Address:
Exhibit A
AFFIDAVIT
Date: May 5, 2005 ___________________________________
Shakti Patriot Ph.D.
Address: c/o