IN THE
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_________
No. 06-14066
D. C. Docket No. 05-00009-MC-FTM-29-SPC
_________
SHERI REDEKER-BARRY,
Petitioners -- Appellants
V.
AMSOUTH BANK,
SUSAN STONIER,
Respondents -- Appellees
__________
__________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
Sheri Redeker-Barry
1500 West Freedom Street
Freetown, SC 00100
(555) 555- 5555
Petitioner Pro Se
_______________________________________________________________
Statement Requesting Oral Argument
Due to the unusual circumstances of this case, and due to the important Constitutional and personal privilege issues of this case, Appellant thinks this may be a case of first impression and requests oral argument. Appellant believes this
Statement of Jurisdiction
Pursuant to IRC § 7609 (h)(1) The United States district court has jurisdiction over third-party summons issued by the IRS. A denial of a Petition to Quash an IRS Summons may be appealed.
The Internal Revenue Service is an Agency of the United States through the Department of Treasury, and an “agency” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 702. The District Court has jurisdiction over Appellant's action against the United States of America and the Sovereign Immunity is waived as to subject matter jurisdiction by Congress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201 and 5 U.S.C. § 702.
Statement of Corporate Affiliations
Appellant does hereby certify that neither party is a publicly held corporation. No business or corporation has an interest in this case or the outcome of this appeal.
Statement of the Issues
1. Appellee, AmSouth Bank, received an IRS Summons requesting private banking information regarding the Appellant. Appellant timely filed a Petition to Quash the Summons. The AmSouth Bank received their copy of the Petition and their copy of the Notice of Appeal; however, prior to determining the outcome of this case, the legal department of the bank prematurely compiled with the Summons in 2005, even though a District Court Judge did not sign any Order until May 30, 2006. The case was still ‘open’ when the bank complied.
2. District Court employees made unintentional mistakes which negatively effected and hampered this case.
3. Under IRC § 7609, Appellant had the right to begin proceedings to quash said summons. In Appellant’s Petition to Quash, the prominent argument and cite stated was
4. On June 9, 2006, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 30, 2006 Order which had been denied as “moot”. That Order stated “Whether reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, or de novo, petitioner would not be entitled to relief since AmSouth Bank complied with the
Summons” {emphasize added in original). The last Motion filed on June 9, 2006, argued that the Appellant’s civil rights are never “moot.” Appellant had requested relief for the damage that the bank’s premature compliance had already caused the Appellant and her family. (Appellant will attempt to prove, the premature compliance was based on an erroneous denial and ‘final Order’ from a Magistrate Judge). The last Motion which requested relief was denied because the District Court. Judge stated he did not believe a criminal prosecution was pending from which this Appeal springs.
History of the Case
There was no immediate response from the Court, as there had been with the other prior filings. On June 29, 2005, to protect the record, Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal of the June 6, 2005 Order with the 11th
Patiently Appellant waited. Mid-September Appellant noticed on PACER that her case was marked CLOSED. Immediately Appellant called the District Court’s office and spoke with Kimberly Arnett, Deputy Clerk, to ask why the case was marked CLOSED. Ms. Arnett checked the case record and told Appellant there had been a ‘computer error’. Appellant replied, “Now that you know about the error, when will it be corrected”? Ms. Arnett told Appellant that she would need to ’re-file’ her June 15, 2005 Motion to reopen the case. Appellant was astonished, but obediently re-filed the June 15, 2005 Motion on Sept. 28, 2005. Shortly thereafter, the case was no longer marked CLOSED on PACER.
Finally, on Dec. 1, 2005, more than six months after Appellant had filed the unanswered Motion, Magistrate Judge Chappell signed an Order denying the Petition for the third time. (It is Appellant’s understanding that a Motion must have a response from the Court within 90 days from when it was filed. The 90 day limit had already passed before that motion was re-filed). Appellant wants this Court to understand that the Motion was filed June 15, 2005 and Appellant, following the Deputy Clerk’s instructions, only re-filed the same motion again to re-open the case because the District Court had made a ‘computer’ error and had marked the case CLOSED on PACER. The Magistrate Judge erroneously implies that her over-due response is the fault of the Appellant. In her Dec. 1, 2005 Order, in the second sentence, Magistrate Judge Chappell states, “Due to an apparent technical error the Plaintiff re-filed her Second Motion for Reconsideration and thus, the first Second Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #5) is denied as moot”.
On Dec. 30, 2005, Appellant timely filed a Notice to Reinstate Appeal with the 11th Circuited States Court of Appeals. Feb. 13, 2006, the Appeal was dismissed again for the same reasons. Appellant was thoroughly frustrated.
After weeks of research, Appellant figured out why the final Orders from the District Court were not final. On April 11, 2006, Appellant filed a Motion for de novo Determination to force a District Court Judge to sign an Order, one way or the other, which was necessary to get this case into the jurisdiction of this Court (attached and made a part hereof as EXHIBIT D). On May 30, 2006, District Court Judge John E. Steele signed an Order denying Appellant’s Motion as “moot”. Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 9, 2006 (attached and made a part hereof as EXHIBIT E), which was denied in Judge Steele’s Order signed on June 13, 2006.
Statement of the Facts
1. Susan Stonier, Ft. Myers Branch, IRS Revenue Agent, issued a Summons to an AmSouth Bank branch office in
2. On May 17, 2005 Appellant mailed a letter to the Legal Department of AmSouth Bank in
3. Pursuant to 26 USC § 7609, Appellant timely filed a Petition to Quash the AmSouth Bank’s IRS Summons on Monday, May 23, 2005 with the District Court. The next day, May 24, 2005, Magistrate Judge Sheri Pollster Chappell issued an Endorsed Order denying said Petition.
4. Appellant continued her efforts to quash the summons with two more motions. The first motion was filed Thursday, June 2, 2005 and was denied by Judge Chappell on Monday, June 6, 2005. The third motion was filed Wednesday, June 15, 2005, and unlike the first two filings, there was no immediate response.
5. In an effort to protect the record, Appellant timely filed a Notice to Appeal the written Order of June 6, 2005, with the 11th Circuit United States Court of Appeals.
6. This Appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on August 9, 2005 because the order was not final.
7. The Motion filed June 15, 2005 was re-filed on Sept. 28, 2005, due to a computer error at the District Court’s office. On Dec. 1, 2005, Magistrate Judge Chappell signed an Order denying that motion.
8. Appellant Reinstated her Notice of Appeal on Dec. 30, 2005, with the USCA. This filing was dismissed, as well, for the same reason. The order was still not final.
9. Appellant phoned the Legal Department at AmSouth Bank to inquire the status of her summons file. She spoke with Anne Choat, again, who informed her that Kimberly Burkhalter, Supervisor of Records, had released all the information to the IRS in 2005.
10. On March 16, 2006, the IRS issued Summonses to Appellant’s husband and children to attend a hearing at the Ft. Myers IRS office. The agent conducting the hearing told the children they were not under criminal investigation. They were summoned to answer questions about their mother. (copy of the children’s summonses attached and made a part hereof as Exhibit G).
11. On March 22, 2006, the IRS issued four identical summonses to four different Banks (one of the four summons is attached and made a part hereof as EXHIBIT H).
12. Appellant timely filed a Petition to Quash those summonses on March 30, 2006 [case no.2:06-cv-201-FtM-99]. A different judge did not deny that Petition. This time the Appellant was treated appropriately; was given due process; was allowed discovery, and permitted to Request Documents and issue Interrogatories which was done May 12, 2006 (attached and made a part here of as Exhibit I).
13. On April 11, 2006, Appellant filed a Motion for de novo Determination of the Dec. 1, 2005 Order. In this motion the Appellant included copies of the new Summonses and reiterated to the Court that these new summonses were proof that that arguments in all prior motions to quash were correct. The IRS had acted in bad faith.
14. To avoid answering the interrogatories and production of documents, which would have exposed the IRS’s illegal activities, the IRS withdrew the four additional summonses on May 22, 2006 and the US Attorney filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellant’s Petition to Quash as “moot” since the summonses had been withdrawn. The Court dismissed the case (one of the four identical IRS withdrawal letters and the US Attorney’s motion to dismiss are attached and made a part hereof as Exhibit J).
15. Even with this knowledge, on May 30, 2006. District Court Judge John E. Steele signed an Order denying the de novo motion as “moot”.
16. On Friday, June 9, 2006, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 30, 2006 Order. In that motion Appellant included copies of the IRS withdrawal letter, and the US Attorney’s Motion to Dismiss, both dated May 22, 2006, to show the Judge the predictable results when a Petition to Quash is not summarily denied and the Petitioner has the opportunity to issue the appropriate Interrogatories and Requests the appropriate Documents.
17. Even with all this information supporting the Appellant’s claims, on Tuesday, June 13, 2006, Judge Steele signed an Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The Judge stated in his Order, “To the Court’s knowledge, there is no such pending criminal prosecution, and the Court declines to suppress evidence in a case which may or may not ever be prosecuted”. That sentence can only mean the Judge did not read the motion and its exhibits, or the Judge’s view of “Criminal Investigation Division” at the top of the summons and withdrawal letter is 180 degrees opposite from than the norm.
18. Neither of the Respondents to the Petition to Quash, which was filed May 23, 2005, have answered the Court in anyway. Appellant recently phoned the Division Manager at the District Court office in
19. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal for the third time on July 26, 2006, seeking justice and relief now that this Court finally has jurisdiction. Appellant will request this Court to instruct and order the IRS and DOJ that any information obtained from the premature AmSouth Bank compliance of the summons in 2005, or possible future information, gleaned as a direct result of the Am South premature release, be barred from use in any potential criminal prosecution, or any other action against the Petitioner, her husband, Warren T. Patriot, and her two children, Stephen A. Redeker and Lauren A. Redeker. The IRS and the government should not object to this provision because they have stated all along that the summons will only be used for a civil tax liability investigation.
ARGUMENTS
POINT ONE- Third-party “prematurely’ compiled to IRS summons
AmSouth Bank advertises on the internet. This bank has its Privacy Policy exhibited on their website for the public to view (Exhibit F). With regard to Legal process, this bank states the following:
“As required by law, AmSouth will comply with customer information requests through properly executed court orders, such as garnishments, levies, summons and subpoenas.” The bank further states, “A good relationship is all about good communication and honoring expectations.”
The bank statement above is very clear. Only properly executed court orders will cause the bank to comply. The bank did not honor their own Privacy Policy, nor did it honor the expectation of the Appellant. The statement above is a complete misrepresentation appearing in an advertisement to influence the public to bank at AmSouth Bank.
Due to Appellant’s past experience over the past fifteen plus (15+) years, when Appellant read the Privacy Policy on-line; she liked what she read, and opened up an account at a local AmSouth Bank.
The legal department at AmSouth Bank which operates out of
Rather than assume the attorneys in the legal department of AmSouth Bank did not know the law and prematurely compiled, Appellant chooses to believe the attorneys were intimidated by the IRS reputation and the fear of penalty for not compiling quickly. Appellant believes the proximate cause of the compliance was the intimidation and the erroneous immediate denial of the Petition by the magistrate judge.
Appellant has raised this point to allow the Court to have additional information to all the facts which may influence their decision to grant relief for the damage brought on by this compliance.
POINT TWO-District court employee error negatively effected case
Appellant refers to 28 U.S.C.A. s 636 (b)(2), “a judge may designate a magistrate to serve as a special master in any civil case, upon consent of the parties, without regard to the provisions of rule 53 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the
Appellant never received consent forms after she filed her Petition to Quash. Appellant never received, nor signed, a form designated as Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate Disclosure Statement. If Appellant had received a consent form, Appellant would not have consented to have a magistrate judge handle her case. Without Appellant’s consent, all of the magistrate judge’s orders were invalid, and were not even enforceable according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, regulations, legislative law, and case law.
In September, 2005, Appellant phoned the district court office and spoke with Kimberly Arnett, Deputy Clerk. Appellant asked Ms. Arnett was this case was marked CLOSED on PACER. After checking the case record, Ms. Arnett told Appellant that a ‘computer error’ had occurred. Appellant contends that a computer error is a ‘human error’. Appellant asked Ms. Arnett when the error would be corrected. Ms. Arnett told Appellant the (90+-day-old ‘unanswered’ June 15, 2005), Second Motion for Reconsideration would need to re-filed to ‘open’ this case. This requirement seemed ridiculous to the Appellant, but she did whatever was necessary to get this case back on track and re-filed that motion on Sept. 28, 2005, because of another error in the district court’s office, the ‘computer error’.
The magistrate judge took 63 days more to respond to that motion. A total of 164 days to respond to a motion. This was a complete unnecessary waste of very valuable time…..especially when time is of the essence.
As Appellant learned during the course of this case, a magistrate judge has no authority to issue a final order. The earlier Orders from the magistrate judge should have been designated as recommendations so as not to confuse a pro se Petitioner.
Appellant wants to commend the District Court on the judicial handling of the second Petition to Quash filed on May. 2006. Appellant has made herself known at the district court office during the past year, and the remarkable difference between the treatment of the two cases was significant….as was the outcome.
Dec. 30, 2005, Appellant and her husband went together to the district court office to file Appellant’s Notice to Reinstate Appeal and to each file a change of address. The Notice of Appeal and Warren T. Patriot’s change of address [on his own case] were entered into the two different cases (copy of Warren Patriot’s case docket sheet attached and made a part hereof as Exhibit K). but the change of address for the Appellant did not get entered into the record of this case. Appellant still has no idea into which case her change of address was entered, but it was never entered into this case. Later, after several weeks, when USCA correspondence was arriving very late due to being forwarded from Appellant’s former address, Appellant called the District Court office to inquiry why the mailing address was not changed. Appellant was told “If it isn’t entered, you didn’t file it”. Appellant refused to argue at that point, because she was becoming used to the errors. Later Appellant re-filed the change of address.
The most recent error, or ‘over sight’ occurred the first week of August, 2006.
After receiving a letter from Thomas Kahn, Clerk, dated July 27, 2006, Appellant went to the District Court office on Aug. 1, 2006, and paid the $455.00 filing fee CASH for this Appeal. On Aug. 10, 2006, Appellant called Gloria Powell at the USCA in
Appellant acknowledges that after 15 months of ‘surveillance’, the employees at the
POINT THREE– The Internal Revenue Service misleads the court
On May 2, 2005, the IRS used the civil summons power under 26 U.S.C. § 7609 to gather information on Appellant from a financial institution even though the documents were sought for a criminal prosecution of Appellant. The administrative/civil investigation of the Appellant had been conducted over the past five plus years and concluded on Jan. 13, 2005 when Appellant compiled with a summons issued by IRS Revenue Agent, Susan Stonier, by attending ‘another’ hearing at the Ft. Myers IRS office. After the conclusion of that hearing, Appellant asked the agent, if front of Appellant’s witness, if there was any other information the agency required about her. The agent responded that she had everything she needed to finish her investigation.
Within four months a summons was issued to AmSouth Bank. That summons was overly broad, requesting everything….much more than just checks and statements, which would be all the IRS would need to compile a civil tax liability. For a civil investigation, an agent generally request and needs only checks and figures to prove money coming and going. However, for a criminal investigation, agents need signature cards, loan applications, etc. By the IRS’s actions, letters, deeds, and by their fakery, it is very apparent that the summons was an impermissible ruse to gather evidence in a criminal investigation. If the summons in this case were only for civil purposes, the records requested would have been limited to only those third party records which pertain to Appellant’s civil tax liability.
A criminal case can be inferred from other acts of the IRS and by written records. If it is apparent that the focus and determination of a criminal prosecution is made prior to the actual request, the written request of IRS to the Justice Department for criminal action is immaterial. When the focus and determination is criminal, the fact that a formal recommendation for criminal prosecution has not been issued is irrelevant. “Internal Revenue summons issued under such circumstances is not issued in good faith.”
In the instant case, the District Court made no inquiry to the existence of a general civil purpose for the investigation. By not doing so, the abuses delineated by the LaSalle majority have gone undetected and unremedied. Under the lower court’s reading of LaSalle, as long as the IRS had not yet determined the full scope of civil liability the fear of delay by the IRS in making a referral to the Justice Department expressed by Justice Blackmun would be perfectly permissible. Similarly, the Government presumably would allow the Justice Department to use the IRS as an “information gathering agency” as long as the IRS had not closed its civil investigation. LaSalle, of course, prohibits such subterfuge.
In the lower court, Appellant maintained most strenuously that the IRS had issued the summons for a purpose not authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 7609. Appellant filed her Petitioner to Quash the Summons on Monday, May 23, 2005 and the Magistrate Judge, issued an instant Endorsed Denial on Tuesday, May 24, 2005.
In the June 6, 2005 Order, the magistrate judge states, “ In this case, the Plaintiff acknowledges that she does not have the proof, at this time, necessary to defeat the subpoena and establish the subpoena was issued in bad faith.” Appellant denies ever making that acknowledgment. In that same Order, the magistrate judge made no mention of IRC § 7609. The magistrate judge used the term “subpoena” six (6) times with regard to Appellant’s Petition to Quash a IRS Third-party ‘Summons’. No subpoena was involved. This mistake was not a typing error. It was obvious the magistrate judge was mistaken because her Order read like a Grand Jury Subpoena was involved.
The burden of proof is on the Appellant to prove the summons was not issued in good faith. Appellant was entitled to an adversary hearing with discovery to meet her burden. Appellant’s civil rights were violated when due process was prevented.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in U.S. v. Tweel, supra 550 F. 2d 297 (1977) laid down the law as to what their circuit thought about deceit by government officials. In that case the defendant was charged with tax evasion and false statements on his tax return. The main evidence against him was documents he gave to the IRS agents voluntarily. The conviction was thrown out because the agent had used deceit, trickery, and misrepresentation to gain access to defendant’s records. In Tweel, supra, the revenue agent knew that a criminal prosecution had actually begun, and had been informed by his superiors that a search had been planned for some time, yet the agent led the defendant to believe that only civil proceedings existed at that time. The Court held “that from the facts that we find, the agent’s failing to apprise the defendant of the obvious criminal nature of his investigation was a sneaky deliberate deception by the agent…and a flagrant disregard for his rights.”
Further, the Court found that high level IRS officials succeeded “in making clear the undeniable criminal nature of the investigation…. We cannot condone the shocking conduct by the IRS…. During oral argument, counsel for the Government stated that these procedures were ‘routine’. If this is the case, we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception will not be tolerated and if this is ‘routine’ it shall be corrected immediately.”
Appellant knows this ‘routine’ is still going on at the IRS. Appellant’s son and daughter received a summons in March, 2006, to attend a hearing at the local IRS office for the purpose of answering questions about Appellant. They were both told, front of their witness, they were not under any type of criminal investigation. Both of them file and pay their appropriate income tax each year. They have never had any problems with the IRS. In August, 2006, they were notified they are the target of a criminal investigation. The IRS deceit continues. Appellant believes the IRS is trying to extort compliance from the Appellant by intimidating her because the IRS has including her children, and her husband, in their attempt to prosecute Appellant.
It is very clear the Government misrepresented itself with regard to the intended use of Appellant’s financial and personal records summoned from AmSouth Bank.
POINT FOUR- The District Court erred in denying the Petition to Quash
Appellant’s Petition to Quash the Summons was valid and necessary for her to prove her “heavy burden” that the IRS acted in bad faith. The Petition to Quash should not have been denied.
The Supreme Court has already decided that the LaSalle burden for Appellant was for Appellant to prove, not the Government. It stands to reason if Appellant has a certain burden of proof; she is entitled to discovery to meet that burden.
In Herbert v. Lando, 99X. Ct. 1635 (1979)k the Supreme Court stated that in those cases where previous court decisions had formed a certain burden, the party seeking to satisfy that burden was entitled to extensive pre-trial discovery. Given the required proof, Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court, mentioned many times that the plaintiff could obtain the necessary evidence to prove the critical elements in his cause of action, even if the plaintiff had to focus on defendant’s conduct and state of mind. Therefore, the Petition should not have been denied so the Appellant could have had an opportunity for discovery.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
In LaSalle, supra, the court stated that the Petitioner in an IRS Summons Enforcement Hearing has the burden to prove the “improper purpose” of the “institutional commitment.” It stands to reason, especially after the Tax Reform Act of 1976, that the Courts and Congress intended the Petitioner to have a meaningful hearing and to have ample opportunity, prior to the actual hearing, to examine the minds and thought processes of those responsible for the proceedings. The preceding case to
Appellant asserts that the AmSouth Bank summons was issued following an institutional commitment to prosecute all persons classified as “tax protestors” and the IRS had no intention whatsoever of pursuing civil liability. In a number of other cases, many taxpayers-petitioners were allowed pre-hearing discovery even before the heavy burden set forth in LaSalle.
For example, in United States v. Roundtree, 420 F. 2d 845, a taxpayer who claimed harassment was entitled to depose the Internal Revenue Agent to investigate the IRS purpose of issuing a summons.
Appellant has stated that she seeks to prove that in this case the IRS summons is an “impermissible” ruse to gather evidence in a criminal investigation and the entire proceedings, under the circumstances, is an infringement on the traditional functions of the Grand Jury.
In another case, United States v. Nunnally, 278 F. Supp. 843 (D.C., Tenn. 1968), upheld by the Circuit Court at 498 F 2d. 144, the taxpayer was held to have the right of discovery and even to take depositions.
The leading case in this area is United States v. Wright Motor Company, 536 F. 2d 109 (1976), whereby the lower court dismissed the proceeding and almost held the IRS agent in contempt, because the agent, during deposition, refused to answer specific questions about the criminal investigation of the individual. Disregarding the Government’s request for a Protective Order, the District Court determined that the individual would be permitted to take the deposition to investigate the purpose of the request for documents.
In United States v. Genser, 595 F. 2d 146 (3rd Cir., 1979), that Court explained, expanded, and applied the LaSalle case to a particular case. The Genser, supra, Court agreed with LaSalle that the individual was to bear the burden of proving both the pre-existing institutional commitment to prosecute and failure of the summons to advance a civil purpose, however, the Genser, supra, the Court ruled that an individual should be entitled to discover the nature of any contacts relating to and during the investigation between the investigating agents and the officials of the Department of Justice.
Documents in the IRS files show the “institutional posture” is that Appellant was a “tax protestor”, “illegal tax protestor”, and non-filer. In attempting to establish firmly and set guidelines for discovery under LaSalle, the Genser, supra, Court stated:
“[O]ur reading of LaSalle suggests several guidelines for discovery. At a minimum, the taxpayer should be entitled to discover the identities of the investigating agents, the date the investigation began, the dates the agent or agents filed reports recommending prosecution, the date the district Chief of Intelligence Division or Criminal Investigation Division reviewed the recommendation, the date the Office of Regional Counsel referred the matter for prosecution, and the dates all summonses issued under 26 U.S.C. § 7602. Furthermore, the taxpayer should be entitled to discover the nature of any contacts, relating to and during the investigation, between the investigating agents and officials of the Department of Justice.” U.S. v. Genser, supra, 595 F. 2d at 152. “[W]here this information or other evidence introduced by the taxpayer reveals (1) that the IRS issued summons after the investigating agents recommended prosecution, (2) that inordinate and unexplained delays in the investigation transpired, or (3) that the investigating agents were in contact with the Department of Justice, the district court must allow the axpayer to investigate further.” Genser, supra, at 152.
The overwhelming evidence in this case points to a criminal prosecution solely and is, hence, illegal pursuant to LaSalle.
Appellant contends her civil rights were violated when the magistrate judge prevented due process by instantly denying the Petition to Quash. The IRS Summons issued May 2, 2005, was issued in complete bad faith, for the sole agenda of trying to gain some type of information to be used against Appellant in a criminal prosecution. This flies in the face of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 [RRA 98] § 3707, the legislation passed by the U.S. Congress for the purpose of prohibiting the IRS from continuing with their outrageous methods of pursuing individuals and by granting individuals embroiled in the IRS collections process some civil relief.
CONCLUSION
The IRS had been investigating the Appellant since the 1990’s and designated her as a ‘tax protestor’ in their files. They had been harassing her for years and were still unsuccessful trying to collect alleged income tax. The IRS made an institutional commitment to begin a criminal investigation after the conclusion of the Jan. 2005 hearing. The criminal investigation began before the May 2, 2005 summons issued to the AmSouth Bank. That summons was too broad to be defined as a request for documents for a civil investigation. Appellant has committed no crime. Her family has committed no crime, yet due to the erroneous denial of a Petition to Quash of an unauthorized, illegitimate summons, our lives have been turned upside down.
The Magistrate Judge, the District Court Judge and the U.S. Attorney use the term “moot”, as another word for “it’s too late, forget about it”. Appellant feels differently. Her civil rights, guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of the
Appellant appeals to this Court for relief from the result of the combined errors of the district court’s office personnel, the magistrate judge, the district court judge, and the AmSouth Bank. All four, individually and collectively, have ‘unintentionally’ caused a terrible wrong to Appellant and her family.
Appellant ask the Court to issued an Order to the Department of Justice and the IRS to bar the use of any information obtained from the AmSouth Bank, and any other information gleaned directly from the AmSouth Bank compliance, in any potential criminal proceeding against Appellant and her family. The IRS should also be ordered to return all records to AmSouth Bank.
Certification of Service: I do hereby certify that on this date I have mailed properly a copy of this Motion for Reconsideration to all Respondents listed below.
____________________________ _______________________________ Sheri Patriot Date: 1500 West Freedom Street
Freetown, SC 00100
(555) 555- 5555